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GENERALLY speaking, the various state workmen's compensation statutes
establish a scheme of social insurance against the economic consequences of
industrial accidents. Typically, these statutes provide that, regardless of fault,
employers must provide compensation for accidental injuries in accordance
with statutorily established scales and that, in return, employers are relieved
of common-law tort or wrongful-death liability arising out of the employment
relationship.1 Since the enactment of the first American compensation laws,
however, the states have pursued dissimilar policies in distinguishing fully liable
third-party tortfeasors from employers whose liability to employees is limited
by the compensation acts. Moreover, some states allow the employee or his
administrator to receive compensation payments from the employer and to sue
a third-party tortfeasor as well, while other states lodge the exclusive right
to initiate such a suit in the insurer who actually made the compensation pay-
ments. 2 Consequently, if an employee crosses a state boundary in connection
with his employment and then suffers injury or death for which compensation
is subsequently awarded, the contrasting attitudes of the several states may
create difficult choice-of-law questions in a third-party tort suit. These ques-
tions and the kinds of solutions that courts have fashioned are illustrated by
the cases described in the following paragraphs.
Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Service.3 Ralph Biddy, a resident of Michigan and
an employee of a Michigan corporation, was killed in an airplane crash in
Illinois. After his dependents had received an award under the Michigan work-
men's compensation act, Biddy's administratrix commenced a wrongful-death
action in Illinois against the operators of the airplane. Defendants claimed that,
under both the Michigan and Illinois compensation acts, the cause of action
for wrongful death belonged solely to the plaintiff's compensation insurer. 4
Having lost below, the defendants argued on appeal that the trial court's re-
fusal to permit proof of the Michigan law was a violation of the federal Con-
stitution's full faith and credit clause. Agreeing with this contention, the
tfMember of the California Bar.
1. See, 1 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 1-17 (1941).
2. See notes 20-28 infra and accompanying text.
3. 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E.2d 14 (1940).
4. "Insurer," as used in this Article, designates the person who pays or who is
obligated to pay statutory workmen's compensation to an injured employee.
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Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Michigan act-providing that accept-
ance 5 of compensation 0 by an injured employee or his dependents gave the
insurer an exclusive right to enforce the liability of the third party 7 --was
within the "legislative jurisdiction" of the State of Michigan, and that the
courts of Illinois must therefore accord it full faith and credit.
Personius v. Asbury Transportation Co.9 Alleging defendant's negligence,
Personius, a bus driver, commenced a tort action 10 in Oregon for injuries
resulting from a collision in that state between his bus and the defendant's
truck. Prior to commencing the suit, Personius had accepted an award ($44.60)
under the workmen's compensation act of Idaho, the state where he resided
and where his employment contract had been made. The Idaho statute pro-
vided that if an employee accepted a compensation award, the insurer paying
the award would be subrogated to the employee's rights against the third-party
tortfeasor. Accordingly, defendant argued that Personius would have been
nonsuited had he brought the action in Idaho, and that a failure by the Oregon
courts to sustain the defendant's plea in abatement would thus constitute a
denial of full faith and credit to the Idaho act. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
of Oregon affirmed Personius' judgment for $10,000 on the ground that, since
the cause of action was based on the defendant's tortious conduct in Oregon,
the critical issue was whether a remedy for that tort existed under the laws of
Oregon. The court acknowledged that Idaho could prohibit Personius from
suing the defendant in its courts, but ruled that such a prohibition could have
5. Some cases have distinguished between situations in which a formal award has
been made and those in which compensation has been accepted in the absence of an
award. The distinction is not, however, material to the main discussion in this Article
and is, therefore, ignored. See the cases cited by WRIGHT, SUROGATION UNDER WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS 24 nn.7 & 8 (1948).
6. "Compensation," as used in this Article, denotes not only the compensation pay-
ments made or awarded to the employee or his dependents, but also the medical, hospital,
and funeral expenses paid by the insurer and costs of litigation where included by state
law.
7. As used in this Article, a "third party" is a person other than one whose com-
mon-law or wrongful-death liabilities to an injured or dead employee have been abolished
or limited by a workmen's compensation law. Definitions of the term "third party" vary
from state to state. See note 17 infra.
8. The phrase used by the court reflects the basic assumption or theory of the
Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, that, with respect to a particuiar set of facts, a particular
state is assigned the power to create legal interests that must be recognized and enforced
in other states. For criticism of this theory, see COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES
OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS chs. 1-3 (Harvard Studies in the Conflict of Laws Vol. 5,
1942) ; Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy, and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J.
736 (1924); Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, 83 U.
PA. L. REv. 555 (1935) ; Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Con-flict of Laws, 37
YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
9. 152 Ore. 286, 53 P.2d 1065 (1936).
10. The phrase "tort action" is used in this Article to designate both common-law
negligence and statutory wrongful-death actions.
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no extraterritorial effect in Oregon. Citing Supreme Court authority1 1 for
the proposition that the full faith and credit clause does not prohibit a state
court from applying its own law in an action for the redress of an injury occur-
ring within the forum state, the Oregon tribunal concluded that it was not
required to enforce the policy expressed in the Idaho statute.
12
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Goode Construction Co. 13 Budano, who
resided and was employed in the District of Columbia, was injured while work-
ing on a construction project in Virginia on which his District of Columbia
employer was a subcontractor. After accepting compensation from the subcon-
tractor under District of Columbia law, Budano, joined by the compensation
insurer and alleging that his injury was caused by the negligence of the general
contractor's employees, brought a third-party tort action in Virginia against
the general contractor. Defendant urged that Virginia law was controlling and
that, under it, a general contractor is an employer, not a third party liable in
tort to the employees of his subcontractors. The court rejected this argument
on the theory that the compensation law of the District of Columbia, under
which defendant was a "third party," was incorporated in Budano's employ-
ment contract,14 and was therefore controlling.
Standard Oil Co. v. Lyons,15 Raiche v. Standard Oil Co'.16 Lyons and Raiche,
both residents of Iowa, were killed by the explosion of a chemical waterproof-
ing which they were applying inside a large metal tank being built in Illinois.
The dependents of both workers received workmen's compensation awards
under the Iowa act. Thereafter, their administrators, claiming that the manu-
facturer was negligent in selling the chemical without notice of its highly volatile
character, brought separate wrongful-death actions against the manufacturer
of the waterproofing in a federal court in Iowa. The insurer joined in both
actions. In both cases, the court reasoned that the controlling law was the com-
pensation act of the state in which decedent had made his contract of employ-
ment. In the Lyons case, the court then found that because the offer of employ-
ment had been spoken in Illinois and accepted in Iowa (via telephone), the
contract had been made in Iowa. Under the Iowa compensation act, Lyons'
administrator could properly maintain the wrongful death action. In the Raiche
case, on the other hand, the court found that decedent had been in Illinois
when he accepted the offer of employment, and that his contract thus had been
made in Illinois. Since, under the law of Illinois, the acceptance of compen-
11. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
12. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 43-1004 (1932) (at the time of the Personius case), cur-
rently IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-204 (1947).
13. 97 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1951).
14. Id. at 317. For other discussions of this theory, see Magee v. McNany, 10 F.R.D.
5, 10 (W.D. Pa. 1.950); Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108, 122, 231 Pac.
773, 777 (1924) ; Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., 176 Wis. 521, 524, 182 N.W. 852,
853 (1922). See also Betts v. Southern Ry., 71 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1934) ; Alexander
v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652, 658 (E.D. Mich. 1944).
15. 130 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1942).
16. 137 F.2d 446 (8th Cir. 1943).
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sation had the effect of vesting the tort cause of action exclusively in the in-
surer, the court dismissed the administrator's action--despite the fact that com-
pensation had been paid to Raiche's dependents pursuant to the Iowa, not the
Illinois, act.
Choice-of-Law Problems
The foregoing cases typify rapidly increasing litigation which often presents
two difficult choice-of-law problems. The first is to determine the applicable
compensation statute for deciding whether the defendant is a third party. The
second, to decide which state's act establishes whether the employee, his ad-
ministrator, or his insurer may properly assert the third-party tort claim. Un-
derlying both problems is the further question-does the Constitution require
any particular choice of law? These questions arise because definitions of "third
party" vary greatly from state to state,17 and because compensation acts differ
in delimiting the respective rights of the injured employee and the compensa-
tion insurer to maintain a tort action against a third-party tortfeasor once the
employee has accepted statutory compensation for his injury.
These various third-party provisions were enacted not for the benefit of the
third party,' 8 but to protect the insurer's right to reimbursement and to pre-
vent the employee from obtaining the unjust enrichment of a double recovery
-compensation plus tort damages-for the same injury.
19 Some statutes'20
17. In some states the immediate employer alone is exempt from the third-party
classification. See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT. art. 5, § 32, construed in Young v. G. L. Tarlton,
Contractor, Inc., 204 Ark. 283, 288, 162 S.W.2d 477, 479 (1942), and Anderson v. San-
derson & Porter, 146 F.2d 58, 62 (8th Cir. 1945). Some states exclude fellow employees
from the category "third party" and thus from tort and wrongful-death liability. See,
e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-8 (1953) ; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(b) (1953).
Other states limit the liability of all employers who are covered by the local compen-
sation act to the amounts specified in that act. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 311 (1940) ;
MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1949). For a general discussion, see 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
COmPEN SATION §§ 72.00-.70 (1952); 3 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPFNSATION § 842
(perm. ed. 1943); WRIGHT, SUBROGATION UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Acrs
ch. 4 (1948); Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation for Industrial
Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 531, 563-657 (1954).
18. A few states do benefit the third party, if he is an employer operating under
the local compensation act, by limiting the recovery from him to the compensation speci-
fied in the local act. See the Alabama and Minnesota statutes cited note 17 supra; 3
SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S CO.PFNSATION § 836, at 196-97 (Supp. 1958) ; cf. note 21. infra
(third paragraph).
19. Jay v. Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., 150 F.2d 247, 249 (9th Cir. 1945); Magee
v. McNany, 10 F.R.D. 5, 13 (W.D. Pa. 1950); New York Cent. R.R. v. Milhiser, 231
Ind. 180, 187,- 106 N.E.2d 453, 457 (1952); Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co., 37
N.M. 479, 484, 24 P.2d 731, 734 (1933), quoting from McArthur v. Dutee W. Flint Oil
Co., 50 R.I. 226, 231, 146 Atl. 484, 487 (1929); Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., 132
Wash. 108, 123, 231 Pac. 773, 778 (1924); Bernard v. Jennings, 209 Wis. 116, 120, 244
N.W. 589, 591 (1932).
20. The textual description that follows does not purport to be a complete and ac-
19581
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provide that the employee's acceptance of compensation subrogates 21 the per-
son who has paid or is responsible for paying the compensation to the em-
ployee's rights against the third party.22 Under these statutes, the assignee or
curate classification of the various statutes; instead, it is intended to note only the prin-
cipal types which have been involved in the conflicts cases discussed in this Article.
21. ALASKA Coa'. LAws ANN. § 43-3-30 (1949) ; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 2363
(Supp. 1956) (if employee or his representative fails to commence action within 260
days after date of injury, employer or insurance carrier may enforce liability in name
of employee); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 440.39 (1952); HAWAII REV. LAws § 97-10 (1955)
(employer subrogated nine months after date of injury, if employee fails to sue third
party) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-204 (1947) ; M1E. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 31, § 25 (1954) ;
MD. ANN. CODE art. 101, § 58 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 152, § 15 (1957); MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 17.189 (Supp. 1957) (one year after injury, employer may enforce rights
of employee if employee fails to do so) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 (Supp. 1957)
(subrogation limited to cases in which the third party is insured or self-insured for
workmen's compensation purposes) ; Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.150 (Supp. 1956) ; NEv. REv.
STAT. § 616.560 (1956); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 97-10 (1950); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
77, § 671 (Supp. 1957) ; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 11, § 32 (1954); S.D. CODE § 64.0301
(1939) TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 6a (1956) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-62
(1953) ; VT. STAT. § 8078 (1947).
The following statutes are worded in terms of an assignment of the employee's rights
to his insurer: ARIz. CODE § 56-949 (1939) ; CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-13-8 (1953) ;
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-25 (1953); OKLA. STAT. tit. 85, § 44 (1951) (exclusive of
actions by employee's dependents for wrongful death) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 656.320 (1957) ;
S.C. CODE § 72-124 (1952); VA. CODE ANN. § 65-38 (1950); Longshoremen's and Har-
borworkers' Compensation Act, 44 Stat. 1440 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 933
(1952).
The Illinois statute contained a provision that if a third party were bound by the act,
acceptance of compensation would operate as an assignment of the employee's entire in-
terest in the tort cause of action to his insurer, who could recover no more than the
amount of compensation paid. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 166 (1947). The Supreme Court
of Illinois in Grasse v. Dealer's Transp. Co., 412 Il. 179, 106 N.E.2d 124, cert. denled,
344 U.S. 837 (1952), held that provision to be in conflict with the equal protection and
due process clauses of the federal constitution as an arbitrary classification. This assign-
ment section was also held to violate several provisions of the Illinois constitution. See
critical note, Illinois Workmwn's Compensation: Recovery of Damages From Third Party,
Employer Tortfeasors, 48 Nw. U.L. REv. 514 (1953), in which the Grasse case is read
narrowly as affecting only actions by compulsorily, rather than electively, bound em-
ployees against compulsorily bound employers. A broader construction was accepted in
a subsequent case, Geneva Constr. Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 351 Ill. App.
289, 114 N.E.2d 906 (1953), in which the distinction between compulsorily and electively
bound employees and employers is not mentioned. This case also established that, in
Illinois, insurers have a common-law right to subrogation for the amount of compen-
sation paid, in the absence of a statutory provision therefor. On the latter point, see
note 77 infra.
22. Some of the statutes cited in note 21 .supra, as well as the earlier legislation
from which they were derived, required an injured employee to make a complicated and
often inequitable election either to seek compensation or to pursue the third party; he
could not do both. Most states have now abandoned this election system, and courts and
legislatures have made its operation less harsh in the states where it still remains. See
Riesenfeld, supra note 17, at 569; statutes cited notes 23 and 24, infra.
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subrogee can proceed directly against the third party,23 the employee being
entitled to any recovery in excess 24 of the compensation award. Other statutes
permit the employee to maintain a tort action against the third party, but pro-
vide that the insurer has a lien on the judgment recovered for the amount of
the compensation award, or is entitled to reimbursement for that amount from
the proceeds of the action.25 Several statutes also provide that if the employee
does not bring his action against the third party within a specified time (usually
six months or one year), his insurer may do so. 26 In only two states are the
compensation acts silent as to the maintenance of tort actions against third
parties.2 7 In both, courts have held that the employee may retain the compen-
sation award and the proceeds of his tort recovery without reimbursing his
insurer for the compensation benefits received.
2
The administration of these third-party provisions is sufficiently difficult in
cases in which all of the relevant events occurred within one state. A case in-
volving contacts with two or more states presents added complications, how-
ever, for the compensation laws do not include provisions designed to resolve
a conflict of laws. The purpose of this article is to discuss the problems created
by multi-state fact situations and to evaluate the choice-of-law rules that courts
apply in resolving those problems.
29
23. See the.statutes of Florida, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina,
South Carolina and Puerto Rico cited note 21 supra.
24. This provision is common to all of the statutes cited in note 21 supra, the only
exception being of the kind cited in note 18 supra.
25. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 312 (Supp. 1955) ; ARE. CoNsT. art. V, § 32; ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 81-1340 (Supp. 1957) ; CAL. LAn. CODE §§ 3852, 3856; CONN. GEN. STAT. §7425
(1949); GA. CODE ANN. § 114-403 (Supp. 1955); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 172.40
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1957); IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-1213 (Supp. 1955); IOwA CODE ANN.
§ 85.22 (1946) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 44-504 (Supp. 1957); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 342.055 (1955); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1101 (1950); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061
(Supp. 1957); MISS. CODE ANN. § 6998-36 (1952); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 92-204
(1947) (lien for lesser of one-half compensation paid or damages recovered) ; NEB. RFV.
STAT. § 48-118 (1952); N.J. REv. STAT. § 34:15-40 (Supp. 1957); N.Y. Wo0xmEN's
Comp. LAW § 29; N.D. REv. CODE § 65.0109 (Supp. 1949) (plaintiff a trustee for in-
surer); ORLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 44 (1951) (no subrogation in cases where an
employee's dependents are asserting a cause of action for wrongful death); R.I. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 28, § 35-58 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-914 (1955); Wis. STAT.
§ 102.29 (1953). See also Federal Employee's Compensation Act, 39 Stat. 747 (1916),
as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 776, 777 (1952) (employee can accept compensation and sue
the third party unless the Bureau of Employees' Compensation orders an assignment of
his tort cause of action).
26. See statutes of Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Jersey
and New York cited note 25 supra.
27. These states are Ohio and West Virginia. See Trumbull Cliffs Furnace Co. v.
Shackovsky, 27 Ohio App. 522, 161 N.E. 238 (1923) ; Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co.,
79 W. Va. 669, 92 S.E. 112 (1917).
28. Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 33 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.
W. Va.), aff'd, 115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1940); Truscon Steel Co. v. Trumbull Cliffs
Furnace Co., 120 Ohio St. 394, 166 N.E. 368 (1929); George v. City of Youngstown,
139 Ohio St. 591, 41 N.E.2d 567 (1942).
29. The difficulties involved in this attempt have been noted by several scholars.
1958]
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CONSTITUTIONAL FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN THE CHOICE OF STATUTORY
LAW
It has long been uncertain whether the full faith and credit clause requires
a particular choice of law to determine, first, whether a given defendant is a
third party and, second, whether the employee-plaintiff may bring a third-party
tort action,30 for courts have given conflicting interpretations of that clause in
this context.31 In 1955, however, the Supreme Court in deciding Carroll v.
See, for example, HoaoviTz, NWFORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 342 (1944); RIESENFELD &
MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 439-40 n.14 (1950); Dwan, Workmen's Com-
pensation and the Conflict of Laws, 11 'MINN. L. REv. 329, 349-52 (1927) ; Dwan, Work-
men's Compensation and the Conflict of Laws-the Restatement and Other Recent De-
velopments, 20 MINN. L. REv. 19, 44 (1935) ("It is difficult if not impossible to formu-
late many useful generalizations as yet.") ; Riesenfeld, supra note 17, at 571-78. But cf.
2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 88.22-.23 (1952). See also WRIGHT, SUBROGA-
TION UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS 15-17 (1948).
30. As is insufficiently realized, giving full faith and credit to statutes elevates choice-
of-law rules to constitutional dignity. In Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S.
514, 516 (1953), for example, the Supreme Court said: "The Full Faith and Credit
Clause does not compel a State to adopt any particular set of rules of conflict of laws;
it merely sets certain minimum requirements which each state must observe when asked
to apply the law of a sister State." The following statement of Justice Black, writing
for the Court in Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951), reflects a more accurate
awareness of the choice-of-law problem: "[lit is for this court to choose . . . between
the competing public policies involved." See also Justice Jackson's concurrence in First
Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396, 401. (1952), and Jackson, Full Faith and
Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUM. L. Rv. 1, 16 (1945).
Despite the clear statements by Justices Black and Jackson, it was said that in Hughes
v. Fetter, supra, (and similar cases) the Supreme Court "was not concerned with the
impact of full faith and credit upon the complexities of choice of law" because "Wis-
consin was not here trying to apply its own law to the transaction . . . ." Reese, Full
Faith and Credit to Statutes: The Defense of Public Policy, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 339, 345
(1952). Although Hughes v. Fetter involved the narrow question whether Wisconsin
could close the doors of its courts to a cause of action based on the Illinois wrongful
death statute, the court recognized that if this question were answered in the negative
(as it was) Wisconsin would have a "constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and
duties validly created under the laws of other states ... ." 341 U.S. at 611. Thus a choice
of law is implicit in the decision, for unless it is assumed that the law of the place of
the wrong is determinative of the existence of a cause of action, the narrow question
presented to the Court could not arise. The same choice of law assumption is made in
First Nat'l Bank v. United Air Lines, supra at 397-98.
For a clear exposition of the argument that full faith and credit involves a constitu-
tional choice of law, see Rheinstein, The Constitutioml Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775, 788-89 (1955).
31 Full faith and credit relied upon as a basis of decision: Bradford Elee. Light
Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932); Ohlhaver v. Narron, 195 F.2d 676, 679 (4th Cir.
1952) ; Alexander v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652, 656-58 (E.D. Mich. 1944) ; Biddy v. Blue
Bird Air Serv., 374 Ill. 506, 511-12, 30 N.E.2d 14, 19 (1940) ; Smith v. Clavey Ravinia
Nurseries, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 548, 560, 69 N.E.2d 921, 927 (1946). But see discussion
of Clapper in note 47 infra. See also Cole v. Industrial Comm'n, 353 Ill. 415, 187 N.E.
520 (1933).
Full faith and credit rejected as basis of decision: Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather,
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Lanza 32 held that the Constitution does not compel any particular choice among
alternative compensation acts in characterizing defendants as third parties.
Carroll v. Lanza was a tort action brought in a federal court in Arkansas by
a subcontractor's employee.3 3 Plaintiff sought redress from a, general contrac-
tor for injuries received in the course of employment in Arkansas. The plaintiff
bad been hired in Missouri, the state in which he and the subcontractor resided.
The subcontractor carried insurance for his employees under both the Missouri
and Arkansas acts, and the plaintiff, before commencing the tort action, had
received compensation under both statutes, although a final award had not been
made under either. The trial court rejected the contention 34 that it was obliged
to give full faith and credit to the Missouri compensation act, which relieved
general contractors of common-law liability for injuries to the employees of
subcontractors.5 Under the Arkansas act, which the trial court held to be
applicable, the defendant was liable as a third party.3 6 The Eighth Circuit re-
versed 3 7 on the ground that Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt 3 8 required a
court sitting in Arkansas to give full faith and credit to the Missouri compen-
sation act. The Supreme Court then reversed the court of appeals.3 9
210 F.2d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1954); Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F.2d
65, 72 (1st Cir. 1944) ; Magee v. McNany, 10 F.R.D. 5, 12-13 (W.D. Pa. 1950) ; Miller
v. Yellow Cab Co., 308 Ill. App. 217, 227-33, 31 N.E.2d 406, 410-12 (1941) (citing, inter
alia, Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., supra, and Personius v. Asbury Transp. Co., 152
Ore. 286, 310-11, 53 P.2d 1065, 1075 (1936)).
32. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
33. The federal court had jurisdiction by virtue of diversity of citizenship; the
defendant-Lanza-was a resident of Louisiana. Carroll v. Lanza, 116 F. Supp. 491., 494
(W.D. Ark. 1953).
34. Id. at 501-03.
35. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 287.040 (1952) ; Bunner v. Patti, 343 Mo. 274, 283, 121 S.W.
2d 153, 156-57 (1938).
36. Aiu. STAT. ANN. § 81-1340 (Supp. 1957) ; Baldwin Co. v. Maner, 224 Ark. 348,
273 S.W.2d 28 (1954).
37. 216 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1954).
38. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
39. 349 U.S. 408 (1955). That neither the majority of the Supreme Court nor the
dissenting Justices (Frankfurter, Harlan and Burton) found any merit in the court of
appeals reliance on the Magnolia case is noteworthy. The majority concluded that Mag-
nolia was not in point because the plaintiff in that case had obtained a final award of
compensation in the state of injury before returning to the state of his residence to com-
mence a second action. The Court made no mention of the fact that the second action
was not in tort but was a claim for additional compensation under the statute of the
employee's home state. In connection with its discussion of Pacific Employers Ins. Co.
v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), however, the Court did assert that the
fact that Carroll v. Lanza was a common-law tort action rather than a claim for statu-
tory compensation "is not in our judgment a material difference." 349 U.S. at 412. Al-
though this statement in the future properly might be limited so that the "balancing of
interests" doctrine of full faith and credit to statutes is equally applicable to actions for
tort or for compensation, in light of the Court's ground for distinguishing the Magnolia
case the quoted declaration nevertheless might be interpreted to mean that where an
employee has received a final compensation award under the statutes of one state, a
1958]
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In an opinion by Justice Douglas, the Court applied the "balancing of in-
terests" doctrine of Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident
Commission.40 Pacific Employers, the Court said, "teaches that in these per-
sonal injury cases the State where the injury occurs need not be a vassal to the
home state and allow only that remedy which the home State has marked as
the exclusive one. The State of the forum also has interests to serve and pro-
tect." '41 Because the state of injury has "large and considerable" interests such
as the "problems of medical care and of possible dependents, '42 the Court con-
cluded that Arkansas could refuse to adopt Missouri's policy and could apply
its own law "even though in this case Carroll's injury may have cast no burden
on her or on her institutions. ' 43 In so holding, the Court actually extended the
Pacific Employers doctrine, since that case, unlike Carroll, involved not a tort
action but a claim for statutory compensation.44 Thus, the effect of Carroll is
to enable the courts of a state in which an injury has occurred to apply the laws
of that state in determining whether the injured employee is limited to statu-
tory workmen's compensation or has, in addition, a remedy in tort. By analogy,
established construction of the full faith and credit clause 45 should give the
constitutional mandate requires that those statutes must control any tort action there-
after commenced in any other state. Such a proposition is plainly at variance with the
Court's reasoning in Carroll v. Lanza. Therefore, it would have been preferable to have
distinguished the Magnolia case on the ground that the employee's second action was for
statutory compensation and not for tort recovery, and that his rights to compensation
had become res judicata by the earlier final compensation award in the state of injury.
See Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 44 CoLum. L. REv. 330, 346-51 (1944).
The constitutional issues involved in Carroll v. Lanza have been discussed in several
articles: Clark, Work-Injuries and the Constitution: Carroll v. Lanza, 1956 WAsH.
U.L.Q. 320; Hogan, Constitutional Implication, of Workmen's Compensation and Choice
of Law, 7 HASTINGS L.J. 268 (1956); Langschmidt, Choice of Law in Worknmwns Com-
pensation, 24 TENN. L. REv. 322 (1956); Stone, The Forum's Policy and the Defense
of Faith and Credit to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 41. IowA L. REV. 558 (1956).
40. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
41. 349 U.S. at 412.
42. Id. at 413. justice Frankfurter in his dissenting opinion disagreed: "... the in-
terest of the forum here is solely dependent on the occurrence of the injury within its
borders. No rights of Arkansas residents are involved, since none of the parties is an
Arkansan; the workman [Carroll] was removed immediately to a Missouri hospital and
has, so far as appears, remained in Missouri." Id. at 420. Carroll had, however, received
compensation under the Arkansas act. See also note 50 infra.
43. 349 U.S. 412, 413 (1955).
44. The Court declared that this "is not in our judgment a material difference." Id.
at 412. Cf. Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 541 (1935):
The fact that the contract [of employment] is to be performed elsewhere does
not of itself put these incidents beyond reach of the power which a state may
constitutionally exercise. [Citations.] While a similar power to control the legal
consequences of a tortious act committed elsewhere has been denied, [citations],
the liability under workmen's compensation acts is not for a tort. It is imposed
as an incident of the employment relationship ....
45. Ibid., holding that the California courts need not give full faith and credit to
the workmen's compensation acts of the place of injury (Alaska), but, on the basis of
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courts of a state in which the injured employee's contract of employment was
made a similar freedom from constitutional compulsion when a third-party tort
action is commenced in that state.4 6
Carroll v. Lanza extends other recent decisions constricting the area of con-
stitutional compulsion for state choice-of-law decisions.47 In Pacific Employers,
for instance, the Court had given attention to the relative weight of the interests
of California and Massachusetts and had emphasized that California, the forum
state, attached importance to its policy of affording plaintiff a remedy under
local law. 48 In Carroll, however, the Court necessarily implied that the interests
of the injured employee's home state and of the state in which the tort occurred
need no longer be balanced in the light of each particular fact situation.49 The
Court held that the mere occurrence of the injury in Arkansas, without more,
was sufficient to give courts sitting in Arkansas complete freedom in making
their choice of law. Moreover, the Court stated that this choice-of-law freedom
would exist were Arkansas' interests not actually present in any given case 80
but only inherent in the "kind of situation presented." 1
Carroll v. Lanza suggests that the present Court will continue to narrow the
area in which the full faith and credit clause is said to require a particular
choice of law. Although the issue was not raised there, the decision supports
the fact that the employment contract had been made in California, could award com-
pensation under the California statutes.
46. This proposition was held in Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954), 67 HAv. L. Rzv. 1281. The noncon-
stitutional choice-of-law problem in this case is discussed in the text accompanying note
62 in!ra.
47. Watson v. Employers Liability Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Cardillo v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Acc. Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,
294 U.S. 532 (1935). By its decision in Carroll v. Lanza, the Court has now completely
overruled Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932), and discarded what
remained of that case after the inroads made earlier in Alaska Packers and Pacific
Employers. In Carroll v. Lan.ca, the Court remarked that Pacific Employers "departed,
however, from the Clapper decision." 349 U.S. at 412. Compare Justice Stone's concurring
opinion in the Clapper case with the opinions he wrote for the Court in the Alaska Packers
and Pacific Employers cases.
48. 306 U.S. at 504; see Justice Frandurter's dissenting opinion in Carroll v. Lanza,
349 U.S. 408, 421 n.3 (1955).
49. The Court thus rejected the procedures followed in Bradford Elec. Light Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (interests of home state and state of injury carefully ex-
amined), and Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 550 (1935)
(interests of California, the forum and place of contract, found "greater" than those of
Alaska).
50. In dissent, Justice Frankfurter, after reciting the facts to show that Arkansas had
no particular interest in the case before the Court, remarked upon the extent to which
the majority was departing from the theory of the Clapper case: "What might be re-
garded as the societal interest of Arkansas in the protection of the bodily safety of
workers within its borders is an interest equally true of any jurisdiction where a work-
man is injured and exactly the sort of interest which New Hampshire had in Clapper."
Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408, 420-21 (1955).
51. 349 U.S. at 413.
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the inference that the forum is free to apply its own conflicts rules in deciding
whether an injured employee or only his compensation insurer is entitled to
maintain a third-party tort action. The inference finds further support in the
fact that a state's interest in determining who may assert a cause of action in
its courts is perhaps an even more important and fundamental interest than
one based on the possibility of a burden on the state's resources caused by in-
adequately compensated 52 workers.
53
In sum, the Constitution affords no guidance in solving the conflict-of-laws
problems under consideration. Attention must turn, therefore, to nonconstitu-
tional standards applicable in this area.
NONCONSTITUTIONAL CHOICE-OF-LAW CRITERIA
Who is a Third Party?
In some states, an injured worker may sue a "fellow employee" in a third-
party tort action; in others, the injured worker is restricted to statutory com-
pensation. Similarly, some states regard a general contractor as an employer
of the employees of his subcontractor and thus not liable to them in tort; else-
where, the general contractor is a third party vis-i-vis the employees of his
subcontractors. Thus, in cases in which the relations of the parties have rele-
vant contacts in two or more states, the choice of law often determines the
liability of the person responsible for the plaintiff-employee's injury.
Courts have rested that choice of law on a variety of theories. Some decisions
rely on the fact that the general contractor was required to insure the em-
ployees of his subcontractors under the law of the state in which the work was
done and the injury occurred. 54 In other cases, courts have sought to apply
the law of the jurisdiction which had the most significant contacts with the
tort.5 5 And in still others, the traditional references to place of injury 60 or
52. It is suggested here that the statutory workmen's compensation is not, by com-
mon-law and statutory wrongful-death standards, "full" compensation. Tort damages will
almost invariably be greater than the statutory compensation for the same injury. Com-
pare the compensation award with the tort judgment in Personius v. Asbury Transp.
Co., 152 Ore. 286, 53 P.2d 1065 (1936), related in the text accompanying note 10 stupra.
53. The right to apply local rules governing capacity to sue is certainly as important
to the forum as the right to apply local statutes of limitation. The Supreme Court has
recently held that the forum's application of a local statute of limitation to a cause of
action based on a sister state's wrongful-death statute is not a denial of full faith and
credit, although the local limitation period expired before that of the sister state. Wells
v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953).
54. E.g., Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 824 (1954).
55. See Ohlhaver v. Narron, 195 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1952); Stacy v. Greenbery, 9
N.J. 390, 88 A.2d 619 (1.952), rev'd on other grounds, 14 N.J. 262, 102 A.2d 48, cert.
denied, 347 U.S. 988 (1954). See, generally, Morris, The Proper Law of a Tort, 64
HARv. L. REv. 881 (1951).
56. Tucker v. Texas Co., 203 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1953) ; Bagnel v. Springfield Sand
& Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 1944); Carroll v. Lanza, 116 F. Supp. 491 (W.D.
Ark. 1953). See also Bernard v. Jennings, 209 Wis. 116, 244 N.W. 589 (1932).
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compensation r5 have been regarded as the primary conflict-of-laws determi-
nants.
Considered factually, these cases fall into two distinct groups within each of
which a choice-of-law pattern is discernible. In the first group, the plaintiff's
presence in the state of injury was clearly of a transient nature. For example,
in Ohlihaver v. Narron 58 plaintiff and defendant-residents of New York and
fellow employees of a New York corporation-were injured in an automobile
accident in North Carolina while on a business trip for their employer. At
trial, the defendant was awarded a summary judgment on the ground that,
under New York law, workmen's compensation is the exclusive remedy for an
employee injured in the course of his employment by the negligence of a fellow
servant. In affirming the judgment for defendant, the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that New York law was applicable because the plaintiff, the defendant, and
their employer were New York residents, the contract of employment was
made in New York, and the plaintiff's and defendant's activities were directed
from that state. ° Similarly, in Stacy v. Greenberg 60 the Supreme Court of
New Jersey applied New York law since plaintiff and defendant, though in-
jured in a New Jersey automobile accident, were returning to their employer
in New York from a business trip to Pennsylvania. Both parties were resi-
dents of New York who had made their employment contracts there and,
according to the court, had subjected themselves to the New York workmen's
compensation law. The court described them as "merely . . . transients en
route" with a "purely casual" contact in New Jersey, and found nothing in
the public policy of New Jersey that required the application of local law
under those circumstances. 6 '
In the second group of cases, the injured plaintiff has usually left his home
state to work temporarily in another state-frequently on a construction pro-
ject. Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather 62 is typical. Mather, the plaintiff,
resided in the District of Columbia and was employed there by a subcontrac-
tor to work on a construction project in Maryland for which the defendant,
Jonathan Woodner Company, was the general contractor. The subcontractor
carried compensation insurance for his employees under both the District of
Columbia and the Maryland acts, and the general contractor carried insurance
for the subcontractor's employees under the Maryland act. Mather, injured
in Maryland through the alleged negligence of an employee of the general
contractor, did not claim compensation under either statute but brought a
57. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goode Const. Co., 97 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1951) ;
Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 64 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1946), on remand
from 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944).
58. 195 F.2d 676 (4th Cir. 1952).
59. Id. at 679.
60. 9 N.J. 390, 88 A.2d 619 (1952), rev'd on other grounds, 14 N.J. 262, 102 A.2d
48, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 988 (1954).
61. 9 N.J. at 397-98, 88 A.2d at 622-23.
62. 210 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 824 (1954).
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common-law negligence action against the Jonathan Woodner Company in-
stead. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the law
of Maryland was controlling because Maryland was the place of injury, 3 and
because the general contractor was required by that state to provide compen-
sation insurance for the employees of his subcontractor.
4
In dealing with similar sets of facts, the First and Fifth Circuits have made
their choice of law solely on the basis of the place of injury. 5 The federal
court for the Western District of Arkansas has grounded its choice not only
on the occurrence of the injury within the state but on "the public policy in
Arkansas favoring common-law right of action for injuries to persons and
property."6 6 At the other extreme, the federal court for the Eastern District
of Virginia has attached little importance to the facts that the injury occurred
within Virginia and that the general contractor was required to carry com-
pensation insurance for the employees of his subcontractor under the law of
Virginia.67 Rather, the court applied the law of the District of Columbia,
which was where the plaintiff-employee 68 and the subcontractor for whom he
63. Citing Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944).
Although it is clear that Maryland law exempts a general contractor from tort lia-
bility to the employees of his subcontractor, that question was assumed still to be open
in the District of Columbia. In Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goode Const. Co., 97 F. Supp.
316 (E.D. Va. 1951), it was assumed that the law of the District of Columbia was clear
on the point and that a general contractor was not exempt from tort liability to the
employees of his subcontractor.
64. 210 F.2d at 874. In making this point the court attempted to generalize from
previous cases and said: "[I]n an employee-employer suit, if some workmen's com-
pensation act purports to bar the action, that bar will be applied in the forum." Id. at
873. Although this statement is undoubtedly a fair generalization of the cases in which
an employee has attempted to sue his immediate employer in tort, it is clearly erroneous
as applied to cases of the kind that was before the court in Jonathan Voodner. See Car-
roll v. Lanza, 116 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goode
Const. Co., 97 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1951); Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co.,
64 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1946). The court's statement begs the question, for it speaks
only of an "employee-employer suit," whereas in the Jonathan Woodner case the primary
question was whether the defendant, a general contractor, was an "employer" of the
plaintiff within the meaning of the Maryland and District of Columbia compensation acts.
65. Tucker v. Texas Co., 203 F.2d 918 (5th Cir. 1953); Bagnel v. Springfield Sand
& Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944). On remand in the Bagnel case, 64 F. Supp.
768 (D. Mass. 1946), the federal district court for the District of Massachusetts held
that the law of Massachusetts (the le. loci delicti) could have no application to the case
because the workmen's compensation law of that state by its terms did not apply unless
compensation had been paid under the Massachusetts act. Therefore, the law of New
York, under which the plaintiff received compensation, was held controlling and, since
the defendant general contractor was a third party under the New York law, the action
was ordered to trial.
66. Carroll v. Lanza, 116 F. Supp. 491, 502 (W.D. Ark. 1953). Subsequent proceed-
ings, which have been discussed in text accompanying note 32 supra, involved solely
constitutional issues.
67. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goode Const. Co., 97 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1951).




worked resided, where the plaintiff was normally employed, and where his
contract of employment was made with reference to the local workmen's com-
pensation act. Consequently the general contractor was held not to be exempt
from tort liability to the employees of his subcontractors.
It is apparent that case law establishes no clear line of decision on the
choice-of-law problem involved in determining who is a third party. Prac-
tically all recent cases do indicate, however, that courts find it necessary to
refer to more than simply the place of injury, contract, or trial. Although
place of injury still carries great weight, the courts seem to be groping toward
a "proper-law" concept in which the following factors are weighed: the tran-
sitory character of the injured employee's presence in a particular state, the
place of compensation, whether the injured employee's contract specifically
refers to one particular compensation act, whether the general contractor is
legally required to insure the employees of his subcontractors, and whether
the public policy of the forum favors expansion or restriction of employees'
common-law remedies.
Who is Entitled to Maintain the Third-Party Tort Action?
The nonconstitutional choice-of-law rules applied by courts to determine
whether the plaintiff may maintain a third-party tort action have focused
upon the place of compensation,6 9 the place of injury,70 and the place of em-
ployment.71 Since none of these formulas produce desirable results in all of
the varying fact situations, inquiry should be directed to the choices of law
actually made in different factual contexts.
Forum as the Place of Compensation but not the Place of Injury
In cases in which the forum for the third-party action is the state where
compensation was accepted or awarded but is not the state in which the com-
pensable injury occurred, the courts, with one exception, 72 have en-
forced the applicable subrogation provision, if any, of the local compensation
act. The third party has thereby been protected from separate lawsuits by
the injured employee and the insurer, and the insurer's right to reim-
bursement has been assured by allowing him to intervene in an employee's
action,7" to continue an action commenced by the administrator of an
69. See, e.g., cases cited notes 73-75, 90, 97, and the second paragraph of note 94
infra.
70. See, e.g., cases cited notes 72, 92 infra.
71. See, e.g., cases cited note 91 infra.
72. Bernard v. Jennings, 209 Wis. 116, 244 N.W. 589 (1932); Anderson v. Miller
Scrap Iron Co., 176 Wis. 521, 182 N.W. 852 (1921), aff'd on rehearing, 176 Wis. 529,
187 N.W. 746 (1922) ; see text accompanying note 83 infra.
73. Carlson v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 103 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1.952) ; Sloan v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.W. Va. 1939).
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employee's estate, 74 to join with an administrator as a party plaintiff, 75
to commence and maintain a tort action against the third party,70 to sue the
third party on an implied contract of indemnity,7 7 and to sue the employee
or his administrator after the employee has recovered from the third party.
78
The single exception to this rule is found in the previously described Lyons
and Raiche cases, 79 which demonstrate the fallacies inherent in mechanically
applying an over-simplified choice-of-law rule, and the necessity for deliberate
characterization of the problem to be solved. Both cases arose from the same
accident and were decided by the same court. Both decedents were employed
on a temporary day-to-day basis, both were residents of Iowa, and the de-
pendents of each received compensation awards under the Iowa act. Despite
the overwhelming similarity in the factual situations, the court held that
Lyons' administratrix could maintain a wrongful-death action against the
74. Betts v. Southern Ry., 71 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1934).
75. Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), revers-
ing 111 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) ; Standard Oil Co. v. Lyons, 130 F.2d 965 (8th
Cir. 1942).
76. This is the effect of the decision in Raiche v. Standard Oil Co., 137 F.2d 446
(8th Cir. 1943), dismissing the action commenced by the deceased employee's adminis-
trator on the ground that the estate had no interest in the cause of action, that all of
the cause of action had "passed" to the insurer under the law of Illinois. See the text
following note 79 infra.
77. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 620 (W.D. Wis.
1950). A growing minority of courts allows the insurer to recover from the third party
on quasi-contractual principles. See Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation
for Industrial Accidents Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. Rxv. 531, 568 nn.225 & 226 (1954).
By limiting the recovery to the amount of compensation paid and allowing that recovery to
be set off against a judgment recovered against the third party in a tort action (see
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra at 623), these cases are in accord
with the general policy immunizing the third party from double liability. They are, how-
ever, in conflict with the frequently expressed policy that the third party should not be
subjected to double suit. It may be questioned therefore whether this trend should be
encouraged. See Staples v. Central Sur. & Ins. Co., 62 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1932) ; Note,
35 MINN. L. REv. 685 (1951). That at least one of the states that allow quasi-contrac-
tual recovery by the insurer (Illinois-Hyland v. 79 W. Monroe Corp., 2 Ill. App. 2d
83, 118 N.E.2d 636 (1954), Geneva Const. Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co., 351
Ill. App. 289, 114 N.E.2d 906 (1953)) is also a state that grants the insurer an exclusive
right to maintain the third-party action after it has paid compensation is also noteworthy.
If the insurer sues on an implied contract of indemnity rather than in tort, the injured
employee would lose any chance of recovering tort damages in excess of the amount of
compensation. This is, of course, but another way of stating the general criticism of
giving either the insurer or the employee the exclusive right to sue; if the insurer has
the exclusive right he has no economic interest in seeking any recovery in excess of the
compensation benefits and the employee ought not to have to depend on the insurer's
good will in obtaining the balance. If, on the other hand, the exclusive right is given to
the employee, the insurer should not be dependent for reimbursement on the diligence
of ill-informed, irresponsible or dishonest employees.
78. See the Anderson and Bernard cases, supra note 72. See also In the Matter of
Estate of Hertell, 135 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
79. Text following notes 15, 16 supra.
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third party but that Raiche's administratrix could not. The results turned
upon a choice of law determined entirely by the place where the offer of
employment was accepted. This approach has not been followed in any other
case,8 0 and, when the issue was litigated 81 three years later in Massachusetts,
the court squarely held that the subrogation provisions of a workmen's com-
pensation act could not be invoked unless compensation had actually been paid
under that act.
8 2
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin established a unique doctrine in two
relatively early cases 83 which have since been often distinguished but never
overruled.8 4 In those cases, after compensation had been paid under Wiscon-
sin law for deaths occurring in Michigan and Indiana, the administrators of
the two employees commenced wrongful-death actions in Wisconsin against
the third-party tortfeasors. In each case, the third party moved to dismiss
on the ground that award or acceptance of compensation under the Wisconsin
act subrogated the insurer to the right of action for wrongful death. These
motions were denied because, the court said, the cause of action for wrongful
death was created by the Michigan-or Indiana-legislature, and hence to
hold that payment of compensation under the Wisconsin act vested that right
of action in the compensation insurer is, in effect, to hold that the Wisconsin
legislature has extra-territorial power to modify the statutes of other legis-
latures. Plainly, the court concluded, Wisconsin has no such power. The fal-
lacies in this reasoning have been explored many times and need not be set
forth here.85
80. See, e.g., Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65, 71-72 (1st Cir.
1944).
81. This question was not actually litigated in the Raiche case, for neither court nor
counsel seemed to perceive any issue other than a determination of the factual elements
involved in fixing the place of contracting. There is no indication that the question had
been the subject of briefs or argument.
82. Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 64 F. Supp. 768 (D. Mass. 1946), on
remand from 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1944).
83. Bernard v. Jennings, 209 Wis. 116, 244 N.W. 589 (1932); Anderson v. Miller
Scrap Iron Co., 176 Wis. 521, 182 N.W. 852 (1921), aff'd on rehearing, 176 Wis. 529,
187 N.W. 746 (1922).
84. See Carlson v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 103 F. Supp. 153, 155 (N.D. Ohio 1952);
Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900, 905-06 (N.D. 1954) ; City of Milwaukee v. Boynton
Cab Co., 201 Wis. 581, 589-92, 231 N.W. 597, 597-98 (1930). See also Hughes v. Fetter,
257 Wis. 35, 42 N.W.2d 452, 454 (1950), rev'd, 341 U.S. 609 (1951). It has been sug-
gested that the quasi-contractual recovery allowed the insurer against the third party in
Travelers Ins. Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 620, 622-23 (W.D. Wis.
1950) ; see note 77 supra, may also be traceable to the restrictive rule established by the
Wisconsin court in the cases cited in the preceding note. See Riesenfeld supra note 77,
at 576 n.251.
85. See Mr. Justice Traynor, writing for the court, in Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d
421, 289 P.2d 218 (1955), and Professor Ehrenzweig's comment thereon, Parental I-m-
reunity in the Conflict of Laws: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 23 U. Cmi.
L. Rnv. 474 (1956). See also Ford, Interspousal Liability for Automobile Accidents in
the Conflict of Laws: Lau? and Reason Versus the Restatement, 15 U. PiTT. L. REv. 397,
403 nn.21 & 22 (1954), and materials there cited.
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The Wisconsin court stated an alternative ground for its holding which,
however, does require comment. It said that the acceptance of compensation
by the employee's dependents could not effect an assignment to the insurer
because the dependents did not own the cause of action for wrongful death;
and that, under the Michigan statute, for instance, the cause of action belongs
to the employee's estate and can be asserted only by the administrator of that
estate. This result fails to give adequate consideration to the insurer's interest
in reimbursement. Although the court said by way of dictum that the insurer
has a right-presumably on quasi-contractual grounds 10-to reimbursement
from the proceeds of the administrator's tort suit, this remedy requires two
actions to accomplish what could be done in one and makes the insurer's in-
terest in reimbursement entirely dependent upon the employee's or adminis-
trator's diligence and effectiveness in asserting the third-party claim. As the
very existence of the subrogation provisions suggests, compensation insurers
have found the employee's diligence and effectiveness lacking.8 7
An employee's "dependents" under a workmen's compensation act will
often differ slightly from those who may recover for his wrongful death, but
this difference need not prevent subrogation. It need affect only the distribu-
tion of the proceeds of the compensation award and the proceeds of the
judgment in the wrongful-death action, with subrogation limited to the "com-
pensation-dependents' " share in the proceeds of the wrongful-death suit. 8
The administrator does not "own" the cause of action for wrongful death in
any real sense, and his standing as plaintiff, as well as the subrogated in-
surer's, is a procedural question that should be governed by the law of the
forum. 89
Forum as the Place of Injury but not the Place of Compensation
In by far the largest number of cases involving a third-party tort action
commenced in the state of injury the courts have chosen the law of the state
under which compensation was paid 90 to determine entitlement to sue. A few
86. See note 77 supra.
87. Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1954). See also In the Matter of
Estate of Hertell, 135 Misc. 36, 237 N.Y. Supp. 655 (Surr. Ct. 1929).
88. See RIESENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 429-30 (1950).
89. The undesirability of applying any other rule is well illustrated by Komlos v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436, 439-40 (2d Cir. 1953).
90. Kelley v. Summers, 210 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1954); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Goode Const. Co., 97 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Va. 1951) ; Hebia v. Select Lake City Theater
Operating Co., 11 F.R.D. 1.13 (N.D. Ill. 1950) ; Koepp v. Northwest Freight Lines, 10
F.R.D. 524 (D. Minn. 1950); Magee v. McNany, 10 F.R.D. 5 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Mary-
land to Use of Carson v. Acme Poultry Corp., 9 F.R.D. 687 (D. Del. 1949) ; Alexander
v. Creel, 54 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. Mich. 1944); Sloan v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
27 F. Supp. 108 (S.D.W. Va. 1939); Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 374 Ill. 506, 30
N.E.2d 14 (1940) ; Miller v. Yellow Cab Co., 308 I1. App. 217, 31 N.E.2d 406 (1941) ;
New York Cent. R.R. v. Milhiser, 231 Ind. 180, 106 N.E.2d 453 (1952); Employer's
Liability Corp. v. Webb, 283 Ky. 115, 140 S.W.2d 825 (1940); Saloshin v. Houle, 85
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of these courts have referred to that law because it was the law of the place
of the employment contract, which, by construction, incorporated the local
compensation act.0' In a minority of cases, on the other hand, standing to
sue was established under the law of the forum on the ground that it was
the law of the place of injury. Some of these decisions include specific refer-
ences to the provisions of the compensation law of the place of injury ;92
others do not.93 A few suggest that the issue should be determined by the
law of the forum not because it is the law of the place of injury but because
the essential problem is whether the plaintiff is a real party in interest having
capacity to sue.94
Forum as Neither the Place of Compensation nor of Injury
Whenever a plaintiff commences a third-party action in a jurisdiction other
than that of the place of compensation or injury, he usually chooses the state
of the defendant's residence. Such a choice of forum, however, has not affected
the plaintiff's chances of recovery. To the contrary, in practically all of these
cases judgments were rendered against the third party regardless of whether
the injured employee or his compensation insurer was the plaintiff, 5 and
several decisions in this category emphasize a policy favoring third-party tort
N.H. 126, 155 At. 47 (1931) ; Privetera v. Hillcrest Homes, Inc., 29 N.J. Super. 591,
103 A.2d 55 (L. 1954); Zurich Gen. Acc. & Liab. Ins. Co. v. Ackerman Bros., 124
N.J.L. 187, 11 A.2d 52 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940); Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co.,
37 N.M. 479, 24 P.2d 731 (1933) ; Solomon v. Call, 159 Va. 625, 166 S.E. 467 (1932) ;
Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 103, 231 Pac. 773 (1924). See also Benoit
v. Hathaway, 310 Mass. 362, 38 N.E.2d 329 (1941); Wagner v. City of Duluth, 211
Minn. 252, 330 N.W. 820 (1941).
91. See Alexander v. Creel, supra note 90; Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., smpra note
90; Stacy v. Greenberg, 9 N.J. 390, 88 A.2d 619 (1952).
92. See, e.q., Bagnel v. Springfield Sand & Tile Co., 144 F.2d 65 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 735 (1944); Van Wie v. United States, 77 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Iowa
1948) ; Henrikson v. Crandic Stages, 216 Iowa 643, 246 N.W. 913 (1933).
93. Jones v. Goodman, 114 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1953); Personius v. Asbury
Transp. Co., 152 Ore. 286, 53 P.2d 1065 (1936) ; Rorvik v. North Pac. Lumber Co., 99
Ore. 58, 190 Pac. 331, aff'd on rehearing, 99 Ore. 82, 195 Pac. 163 (1921).
94. See Jones v. Goodman, 114 F. Supp. 110 (D. Kan. 1953); Magee v. McNany,
10 F.R.D. 5 (W.D. Pa. 1950); Maryland to Use of Carson v. Acme Poultry Corp.,
9 F.R.D. 687 (D. Del. 1949); Reutenik v. Gibson Packing Co., 132 Wash. 108, 231 Pac.
773 (1924).
Only one case has been found in which the injury occurred, compensation was paid, and
the tort action was commenced in the same state. The court assumed that the compensation act
of that state was controlling on the issue of subrogation and entitlement to sue, and held
that plaintiff, by accepting compensation payments for three years, without having applied
for them, had made an election that resulted in subrogating the insurer to the tort cause
of action against the third party. Dinardo v. Consumers Power Co., 181 F.2d 104 (6th
Cir. 1950).
95. In the exceptional case, the period of limitations had expired. Hartford Acc. &
lndem. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 91 Ohio App. 573, 109 N.E.2d 287 (1952).
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liability.96 In order to sustain the right of the particular plaintiff to maintain
his action, the courts in every case looked to the act under which compen-
sation had been paid.97
Whenever the statute of limitations was at issue in these cases, the courts
have uniformly applied the limitations act of the forum " while holding the
law of the state of compensation determinative of when the cause of action
accrued and the nature of the right asserted by the subrogated insurer. Plain-
tiffs have occasionally found unusual favor in the judicial implementation of
these policies. Thus, a federal court in Tennessee interpreted the Texas com-
pensation act as modifying the Texas common law and postponing the accrual
of a cause of action in tort until the injured employee applied for compen-
sation.99 The plaintiff was likewise benefited when a California insurer sued
the third party in a Pennsylvania federal court to recover compensation paid
a worker in California for injuries caused in California by the negligence of
defendant's employee. The court held that, for statute of limitations purposes,
the cause of action asserted by the insurer was one for injury to property.1' °
Accordingly, Pennsylvania's six-year limit for property damage was allowed.
96. E.g., American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. United States Elec. Tool Co., 55 Ohio
App. 107, 9 N.E.2d 157 (1936).
97. See, Carlson v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 103 F. Supp. 153 (N.D. Ohio 1952) ; State
Compensation Ins. Fund v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1952) ;
Hungate v. Hudson, 169 S.W.2d 682 (Mo. 1943); Scott v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 333 Mo.
374, 62 S.W.2d 834 (1933); Hartford Acc. & Indent Co. v. Chartrand, 239 N.Y. 36,
145 N.E. 274 (1924); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. United States Elec. Tool Co.,
55 Ohio App. 107, 9 N.E.2d 157 (1936).
98. See Hutto v. Benson, 110 F. Supp. 355 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), aff'd, 212 F.2d 349
(6th Cir. 1954). On the choice of law in period of limitations problems, see STUMBERG,
CONFLICt OF LAws 147-52 (2d ed. 1951) ; Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the
Conflict of Laws, 28 YAia L.J. 492 (1919).
99. Hutto v. Benson, supra note 98. The reasoning of the court suggests several un-
answered questions. How long can the employee postpone accrual of the tort cause of
action by delaying his application for compensation? If the injury is compensable under
the law of another state and the employee applies for compensation in that state and
not in Texas, when does the cause of action for the Texas tort accrue? If the employee
decides not to apply for compensation but to rely entirely on his tort remedies, when
does the period of limitations begin to run? Can this date be discovered only by hind-
sight?
100. State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 451
(E.D. Pa. 1952). However, compare the California cases on which the court relied for
this proposition (Morris v. Standard Oil Co., 200 Cal. 210, 252 Pac. 605 (1926); City
of Los Angeles v. Howard, 80 Cal. App. 2d 728, 182 P.2d 278 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947))
with Aetna Cas. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 41 Cal. 2d 785, 787, 264 P.2d 5, 6
(1953), in which it was said:
The employee's general damage claim, whether prosecuted by the employee
personally or by his employer or its insurance carrier on his behalf, is solely one
in tort for personal injuries arising out of the negligence of the third party tort-
feasor; hence the cause of action accrues at the time of the negligent act. No
matter who may be the party plaintiff, the cause of action is within the express
terms of [the statute of limitations for personal injuries (I year) ].
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The results in the foregoing cases place an undue burden on third-party
defendants. They are subjected to possible lawsuits for much longer periods
than other tortfeasors merely because the victims of their negligence are em-
ployees with compensable injuries. These adventitious factors are unsatisfac-
tory grounds for nullifying the policy underlying the relatively short period
of limitations for personal injury actions. Moreover, the holding in those
cases conflicts with the majority rule on the nature of the insurer's right as
formulated in, for example, Maryland Casualty Co. v. Paton.',' There, an
insurer sued a third party to recover compensation paid under the California
act for a wrongful death which had occurred in Oregon. In dismissing the
suit, the court rejected the plaintiff-insurer's contentions that its cause of
action was separate and distinct from the action for wrongful death, and that
the period of limitations on its cause of action did not begin to run until it
had paid compensation to the deceased employee's dependents.10 2 This hold-
ing is, of course, consistent with the view that the insurer's right to sue third
parties places him in the same position as the compensated employee and
accords him no more than the capacity to assert the employee's cause of
action.'
03
Cases in Which no Compensation Award was Made before the Tort Action
Commenced
In a few instances, employees have suffered compensable injuries and be-
gun third-party tort actions before receiving either compensation or an award.
Without exception, the question of the choice of law to determine entitlement
to sue was resolved solely by reference to the tort law of the place of injury,
not to the third-party provisions of that jurisdiction's workmen's compen-
sation act.1°4 Indeed, in one case, the injured employee was permitted to
0
101. 194 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1952), 37 MINN. L. REv. 77.
102. The plaintiff relied on the same California cases that were cited by the court
in the State Compensation Insurance Fund case, supra note 100.
103. See Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 91 Ohio App. 573,
575-76, 109 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1952).
This construction accords with the nature of subrogation and with the recent decision
of the California Supreme Court construing the statutory provisions at issue in the two
foregoing cases discussed in text. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
41 Cal. 2d 785, 264 P.2d 5 (1953).
104. See Hynes v. Indian Trails, Inc., 181 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Foster v. Denny
Motor Transfer Co., 100 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1938) ; Rorvik v. North Pac. Lumber Co.,
99 Ore. 58, 190 Pac. 331 (1920), aff'd on rehearing, 99 Ore. 82, 195 Pac. 163 (1921)
(widow of the employee had made an application for an award before she sued the third
party, but the award had not become final; the Oregon court indicated, however, that
the presence or absence of a final award could not affect the result). But cf. Jewtraw v.
Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 280 App. Div. 150, 153-54, 112 N.Y.S.2d 727, 731 (1952).
Cf. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Central R.R., 143 Misc. 589, 258 N.Y. Supp. 35 (Sup. Ct.
1932) ; Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Eaby, 111 Pa. Super. 589, 170 Atl. 352 (1934),
both of which reflect the rule stated in text and hold that the insurer has no subrogation
rights against the third party unless it has paid compensation to the employee.
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maintain the third-party action in the courts of the place of injury despite the
fact that the local compensation act would have barred him from doing so
had he previously accepted compensation. 05
The Trend in the Courts
Of the courts which have considered the problem, a sizable majority 100
have concluded that the question of entitlement to sue in third-party tort
cases should be resolved according to the provisions of the act under which
compensation was paid. A number of these cases were decided at a time when
many compensation acts provided that acceptance of compensation by an in-
jured employee terminated his interest in any tort cause of action against a
third party.10 7 Courts' inquiries about entitlement to sue naturally ended with
the discovery that the employee had no interest in the cause of action. Such
provisions no longer exist,0 s however. Compensation acts now commonly
provide for subrogation only to the extent of the compensation paid, and the
employee is entitled to all tort damages recoverable in excess of that amount.
Nonetheless, present statutes do not deal effectively with the conflict-of-laws
problems involved in tort and wrongful-death actions against third parties.
For example, no guidance is given for choosing among the states' conflict-
ing requirements as to who may initiate a wrongful-death action.'00 More-
over, no procedure exists for assuring a legally enforceable remedy both to
the employee and to his insurer in conflicts cases.
The courts are therefore free to adopt the conflicts rules that best effectuate
the purposes of the third-party provisions in workmen's compensation statutes.
A minority of courts are developing such rules. 10 These courts look to the
law of the state under which compensation has been paid only for the pur-
pose of determining whether the plaintiff is a real party in interest. If he is,
the question of entitlement to sue is resolved by the law of the forum."' This
practice is consistent with accepted choice-of-law rules applicable to problems
of capacity to sue. 12 It also enables courts to achieve the basic policy objec-
tives of the third-party provisions: to prevent the defendant from avoiding
105. Hynes v. Indian Trails, Inc., 181 F.2d 668 (7th Cir. 1950).
106. The fact that there is a numerical majority should not be considered overly
significant, for many of the early cases included in the majority were based upon a gen-
eral legislative policy that since has been changed in many states.
107. See, e.g., the Michigan statute relied on by the court in Biddy v. Blue Bird Air
Serv., 374 Ill. 506, 30 N.E.2d 14 (1940), and the Idaho statute relied upon by the de-
fendant in Personius v. Asbury Transp. Co., 152 Ore. 286, 53 P.2d 1065 (1936).
108. See Riesenfeld, Contemporary Trends in Compensation For Industrial Accidents
Here and Abroad, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 569-570 (1954).
109. See notes 20-28 supra and accompanying text.
110. See text accompanying notes 69-103 supra passim.
111. See cases cited -notes 92-94 supra.
112. See Ehrenzweig, supra note 85; Ford, supra note 85, at 423-26. But cf. CH[E-
SHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 651-54 (4th ed. 1952). See also GOODRICH, CoN-
FLICT OF LAWS § 82 (3d ed. 1949) ; RESTATE-IENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 588 (1934).
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liability, to avert the unjust enrichment of the employee, to protect the in-
surer's rightful expectation of reimbursement, and to safeguard the defend-
ant's interest in avoiding a multiplicity of suits. Additionally, the courts are
not required to administer a sister state's case law and the third-party pro-
visions of its compensation act," 3 but can resolve the entitlement-to-sue prob-
lem by concepts with which they are more familiar.
114
CONCLUSION
In recent years, most states have either abandoned or greatly modified the
cumbersome and inequitable election requirements of earlier third-party pro-
visions; an injured employee may now recover both compensation from his
employer and a tort award from the third-party tortfeasor, subject only to
the compensation insurer's right of reimbursement. At the same time, many
states have adopted provisions designed to protect the rights of both em-
ployee and insurer in a claim against the third party, and to enable either
or both to enforce that claim.1 5 In conflicts cases, changes of equal impor-
tance have taken place. Decisions based upon a mechanical application of
textbook formulas are now rare. In cases involving a choice of law to deter-
mine whether or not the defendant is a third party, the courts more and more
are weighing and balancing a broad variety of factors to choose the applicable
law. Increasingly, decisions involving a choice of law for determining whether
the plaintiff is a proper party to maintain the third-party suit tend to soften
the rigid procedural provisions which remain a part of some workmen's com-
pensation acts. Dismissals on the ground that the plaintiff is not a proper
party to bring the action are becoming less and less frequent; and the courts
are usually successful in choosing a law which, when coupled with appro-
priate procedural devices, adequately protects the legitimate interests of the
three parties principally concerned.
113. Cf. the mechanical jurisprudence in Hebia v. Select Lake City Theatre Operat-
ing Co., 11 F.R.D. 113 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
114. That this is of more than incidental importance is indicated by Cardozo's oft-
quoted remark that conflict of laws is "one of the most baffling subjects of legal
science . . . ." CARDoZo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCrENcE 67 (1928). See also PRos-
SER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 89 (1953): "The realm of the conflict of
laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and inhabited by learned but
eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious matters in a strange and incompre-
hensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is quite lost when engulfed and entangled
in it."
115. See Riesenfeld, supra note 108, at 569.
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